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in the second half of the 19th century. This
weakening of the European marriage pattern
(EMP) can be interpreted as a ‘‘classic’’
response to the increase of the standard of
living, but a more far-reaching interpretation
is that the erosion of the EMP was part of a
cultural shift characterized by the rise of a new,
less instrumental and more egalitarian view on
marriage and partner selection. The latter vision
implies the increase of the preference for a
same age marriage. We test this explanation
by using a combined Belgian-Dutch data
set of marriage certificates (N = 766,412).
Our findings corroborate the ‘‘cultural shift
thesis.’’
From the 16th century onward marriage
played a key role in the long-term population
development of Europe. In contrast to the
situation in other parts of the world, the European
marriage pattern (EMP) was characterized by
late marriage and a high proportion of persons
never marrying. Various authors have also
pointed to the relatively small age difference
between spouses as another distinguishing
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feature of the EMP (Hajnal, 1969). The system
helped to keep population in line with the
economic resources. The key to this unique
marriage pattern was the norm that it was
necessary for a man to defer marriage until
he could establish an independent livelihood
adequate to support a family.
In many parts of Western Europe the age
at marriage and the level of celibacy declined
in the second half of the 19th century. The
erosion of these characteristics of the EMP
has been interpreted as a ‘‘classic’’ response
of relaxation of strict marital norms induced
by the increase of the standard of living,
industrialization, and urbanization, processes
that made old marriage patterns less useful.
A more far-reaching interpretation, however,
is that the erosion of the EMP was also the
consequence of a cultural shift characterized
by the rise of a new, less instrumental and
more egalitarian view on marriage and partner
selection (Coontz, 2005).
In theories about the development of the
EMP, not much attention has been paid to
age differences between spouses. Empirical
studies on the evolution of age homogamy
have been few in number, were based on
limited data sets, and were largely descriptive
(Berardo, Appel, & Berardo, 1993). Hardly
any attempt so far has been made to outline
the different mechanisms that might influence
the level of age homogamy in a society, its
relation with the other characteristics of the
EMP, and the effect that the social and economic
context had on the changes in the level of age
homogamy. We believe that by incorporating
age differences between spouses as a defining
element in the EMP we can shed further light on
the development of the EMP. Age differences
between spouses had wide implications for
the life of the couples concerned. Large age
differences in favor of men were often seen
as an indication of a patriarchal family system
(Cain, 1993). Large age differences have also
been described as an important element in an
institutional system impeding conjugal intimacy
(Barbieri & Hertrich, 2005). The study of
the evolution of age differences thus provides
important information about the quality of the
interpersonal relationship between husband and
wife.
In this paper we examine the evolution of age
differences since early 19th century to study the
shift toward a new marriage pattern. We make
use of a large Belgian-Dutch data set (766,412
marriage certificates) that covers a very long
time period (the 19th and early 20th centuries)
and a wide variety of contexts: five Belgian
cities, among which are the most advanced early
industrial cities of the continent, one (Catholic)
Belgian province containing both urban and
rural areas, and 5 of the 11 Dutch provinces,
Catholic and Protestant ones covering towns
and villages.
THEORY
Age Homogamy as an Indicator of Partner
Selection Criteria
There is not a single source of direct infor-
mation that allows us to study the rise of less
instrumental and more egalitarian partner selec-
tion strategies. To study the criteria applied
in selecting a partner, use has been made of
court proceedings diaries, letters, paintings, and
advice literature, but these sources mostly cover
earlier periods and only refer to very specific
time periods, social classes, and regions. We
propose the use of information on the age differ-
ences between spouses as an indirect measure
of the instrumentality or equality of the marital
relationship.
A first reason is that there is a widespread
consensus among sociologists, anthropologists,
and historians that the magnitude of the age
difference between spouses is an indicator of the
egalitarian nature of the relationship between
men and women (Atkinson & Glass, 1985;
Cain,1993; Mitterauer & Sieder, 1983; Wheeler
& Gunter, 1987). Men in traditional societies
could maintain their control over women
by ensuring that husbands were generally
considerably older than wives and thus could
add the advantage of superiority of age to
that of superiority of sex. The age difference
gave the husband a considerable advantage in
status, experience, and power. In most societies
in which grooms are much older than brides,
a patrilineal kinship structure and patrilocal
residence pattern is dominant, whereas a small
difference is observed in societies in which
bilateral kinship and greater flexibility in the
residence pattern of newly married couples is
the rule.
A second reason is that age homogamy has
also been viewed as a prerequisite for the
emergence of romantic love. Romantic love,
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which can be defined as ‘‘the capacity for
spontaneity and empathy in an erotic relation-
ship’’ (Shorter, 1975, p. 15), implies equality
between husband and wife (Giddens & Pier-
son, 1998). Spontaneity and empathy are not
present in a power relation, ‘‘otherwise the emo-
tional encounter would be impossible’’ (Shorter,
p. 16; Sieder, 1978). At the level of daily rou-
tines, romantic love means conversation, and,
to feed this conversation, people must have
experiences in common. The experience of
belonging to the same age cohort contributes
powerfully to this commonality: Similarity of
values and opinions about marriage and the
family, tastes in leisure time activities, life expe-
riences, and so forth lead to mutual confirmation
of each other’s behavior and worldviews and
enlarge opportunities to participate in joint activ-
ities.
In line with this argument, historians have
considered high proportions of marriages in
which men were much older than their wives as
indicative of a low standard of marital sexuality
(Knodel, 1988; Mitterauer & Sieder, 1983). The
equality and intimacy between husbands neces-
sary, for example, for facilitating discussions of
sexual and reproductive matters, can more eas-
ily be reached among age-homogamous couples
(Safilios-Rothschild, 1972). In contrast to this,
in case marriage is primarily viewed as instru-
mental, as an economic contract, the economic
characteristics of the potential spouses are the
main criterion in the partner selection process.
Romantic love is in that case only of secondary
importance, and age differences are considered
less important.
For these reasons, we assume that age
homogamy will be the result of a partner selec-
tion pattern that is based on less instrumental
and egalitarian principles. But these kinds of
relationships may, of course, also be stimulated
among age-homogamous couples.
A methodological reason to study age
homogamy is its important advantages relating
to the accessibility, coverage, and quality of
information. Marriage registration was already
institutionalized in the beginning of the 19th
century, and this registration covered the whole
population—not only a privileged group. Hence,
comparisons of the level of age homogamy over
time and region and for different social groups
are possible using large-scale demographic
databases.
Why Would Marital Relationships Become Less
Instrumental?
A fundamental factor underlying the EMP was
the instrumental, economic attitude toward mar-
riage. For many people, the self-sustainability of
the new household was a major concern inform-
ing the decision to marry. Of equal importance
was the requirement that the marriage should not
undermine the economic security of the domes-
tic cells in which the couple formerly lived. This
was in particular the case when one’s family
owned property because ill-considered marital
decisions could have negative consequences.
Thus, marriage was an affair of prudence rather
than of passion, an economic contract rather than
a romantic adventure (Arie`s, 1975; Borscheid,
1986). Patriarchy was perhaps not intrinsically
connected to the EMP, yet it was the way in
which this instrumental marriage pattern was
applied. Patriarchy was a central element of
traditional marriage and hence a key element
in the marriage legislation (Napoleonic Civil
Code).
One consequence of the instrumental view
on marriage was older age at marriage.
Instrumental considerations such as assuring the
self-sustainability of the new household were
objectives that required careful arrangements,
and this simply required time. Waiting for
the best moment, the best partner, and the
availability of economic resources led to
postponement of marriage.
This instrumental view on marriage made
sense in times of poverty and an insecure
standard of living (Van de Putte, 2005). It also
made sense in a society in which economic
opportunities were limited and in which property
determined one’s life chances. In particular, in
societies in which economic survival largely
depended on options provided by the family
and the local community, it was recommended
to hold a careful, family-oriented approach on
any decision. This marriage pattern was also
underpinned by a firm cultural basis (Lynch,
1991). For example, in the vision of the Catholic
Church love was not the essential fundament of
marriage—it was seen as a duty rather than as a
condition for marriage (Cloet & Storme, 2000).
In the Low Countries this marriage pattern
came under pressure from the second half of
the 19th century onward. The clearest indication
of the erosion of the EMP was the decrease in
the age at marriage and the percentage never
marrying. One explanation could be to simply
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see this as a relaxation of Malthusian principles:
Because of the new economic circumstances
it was easier to fulfill the requirements of the
EMP. Various mechanisms may have played
a role in this process. The extension of the
wage economy and the declining importance
of inheritance and employment within family
businesses made people less dependent on a
limited number of economic niches, pushed
young people to pool their incomes and therefore
to marry early, and at the same time decreased the
influence of parents on the marriage decisions
of their children. Yet the effect of the wage
economy should not be overestimated because
it was strong in many areas long before the
second half of the 19th century—which makes
it unlikely that the growth of wage economy
as such might explain the shift in the marriage
pattern. Industrialization was also a key factor
in economic change. Especially some Belgian
cities experienced a genuine takeoff, which had
a dramatic impact on the size of the wage
economy in those cities. Yet, in most of these
cities (Ghent, Lie`ge, Verviers), industrialization
also predated the change of the marriage pattern.
Industrialization is thus unlikely to be the sole
explanation. Perhaps more important is that the
new economic circumstances after some time
went together with an increasing standard of
living (Segers, 2003). The rise of the standard
of living did occur in the same time period as
the change of the marriage pattern. Particularly
during the years 1850 – 1873 and after 1890 the
progress was so large that nearly all groups
benefited from it, including the industrial, the
artisanal, the commercial, and the agricultural
sectors (Oris, Alter, & Neven, 2005).
This relaxation of the EMP could mechani-
cally have led to an increase in age homogamy.
If, for the above-mentioned reasons, the age at
marriage decreased, this would have changed
the age structure of the marriage market in
such a way that marrying an age peer became
structurally easier. Indeed the frequency of age-
homogamous marriages depends heavily on the
distribution of the ages at marriage of both
spouses. If many men and women marry early,
marriages are ‘‘squeezed’’ into the younger age
cohorts. Even if they have no special preference
to marry someone of a specific age, these numer-
ous youngsters have more chance to marry an age
peer (Berardo et al., 1993; Van de Putte, 2005).
To sum up, the central claim underlying this
economic perspective is that people no longer
needed to wait too long to marry. A comple-
mentary view is that cultural developments even
stimulated the rise of the idea that marriage
should be based on less instrumental relation-
ships. There are various but closely related ideas
on this topic. Perhaps the strongest claim is that
romantic love became the basis of marriage.
Marriage became a matter of affection and per-
sonal compatibility. The spouse was viewed as
the only, true partner with whom a unique rela-
tionship was established (Shorter, 1975). This
new marriage model has often been interpreted
as a recent ‘‘invention’’ (Giddens & Pierson,
1998). Such a statement is hard to prove. Nev-
ertheless many authors observed indications of
a new meaning of marriage and marital life
that was based on ‘‘growing intimacy, emo-
tionalism and sentimentalism of family life’’
(Mitterauer & Sieder, 1983, p. 60) or, in one
word, romantization (Coontz, 2000), particu-
larly in the second half of the 19th century
(Matthijs, 2001).
There are slightly different views on the
resulting balance between instrumental and
romantic partner selection. First, romantic part-
ner selection is not necessarily completely
incompatible with instrumental partner selec-
tion. Even if individuals look for partners on the
basis of romantic selection criteria, they may be
searching primarily within a group of suitable
potential partners. Romantic partner selection
does not necessarily imply that all instrumen-
tal considerations have disappeared. Second, a
less idealistic interpretation of the change in
the basis of partner selection has been formu-
lated by Gillis (1985) and Borscheid (1986). In
their vision, romantic love became accepted as
a norm among the lower classes but did not
become the true basis of its marriage behavior.
Other authors have argued that, at the best, the
lower class marriage was a union of two com-
rades rather than soul mates or lovers (see Tilly
& Scott, 1978). Third, the new view on marriage
has also been interpreted within the framework
of the companionate marriage model. The lat-
ter model is, however, somewhat paradoxical.
It might appear as a patriarchal variant that
stresses the male breadwinner aspect and female
dependency and a more egalitarian variant that
stresses the companionship between spouses.
The ‘‘classic’’ (bourgeois) family, which was
built around the strict application of formal cri-
teria of what constituted a decent family (Gillis),
indeed combined a sharp division of labor (the
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male breadwinner model) with a companionship
as friends or lovers (Cherlin, 2004). In short, the
companionate marriage model also suggests that
the view on marriage changed less dramatically
than the romantization thesis implies.
In line with the meaning of age homogamy,
we expected a rise of age homogamy on the
basis of this cultural view. Furthermore, also
on the basis of this cultural view, we expected
a connection between the decline of the age
at marriage and the rise of age homogamy.
Less instrumental motives such as romantic love
and comradeship seem to have stimulated early
marriage (Matthijs, 2003; Perrot, 1989). Love
is impatient and urgent. For that reason the
Catholic Church, for example, warned against
the blind love, the levity, and the exaggerated
positive evaluation of physical beauty by the
‘‘friskily, playful youth’’ (Cloet & Storme, 2000,
p. 20). Yet we argue that increases in the
preference for an age-homogamous marriage,
brought about by a cultural change, are not
limited to those who marry at an early age.
A point of discussion concerns the precise
nature of the cultural change. As Marini (1984)
made clear, it is extremely difficult to document
the existence of norms regarding ages at which
people are undergoing role changes. This applies
also to the age ranges within which partners
have to be selected. To prove the existence of
these norms one needs evidence of a collectively
shared evaluation that a marriage has to be
contracted with a partner whose age falls within
a given age range and that sanctions are brought
to bear when a marriage is contracted with a
person outside that age range. There is indeed
evidence that norms regarding age differences
existed. The reading of case records, writings of
moralists, marriage advice books, and proverbs
dating from preindustrial eras provides insight
that large age differences between spouses were,
without exception, considered detrimental to the
purposes of marriage and that the aversion to
these relations was strong (de Wildt, 1995; Haks,
1982). Popular proverbs and sayings reflected
the low degree of tolerance of these marriages
among the population at large (De Cock, 1911).
Proverbs depicted marriages between young
men and old women as ill-assorted marriages
‘‘made by the devil.’’ Holding the reins of the
household—in case the young man married an
old woman for her farm, cows, and money—the
woman could lord over her husband and reverse
the ‘‘natural order of things.’’ From reading
these sources one gets the impression that it
was only marriages characterized by large age
differences that provoked animosity, more so
when women were the older partner of the
couple. A cultural trend toward a stronger
preference for age homogamy could therefore
be interpreted as a consequence of a stronger
emphasis on existing norms rejecting marriages
with extreme age differences. Rather than the
development of a new norm, this would imply
the realization of preexisting norms. More
innovative is the idea that marital relationships
should be based on less instrumental and more
egalitarian grounds.
Where Did the New Marriage Model
Originate?
The susceptibility for a new orientation toward
marriage varied over class, place, and religion.
We expected that those who belonged to the
lower classes (and the middle class), lived in
big cities, and lived in non-Catholic regions
were most likely to have a marriage pattern,
to a lesser degree affected by instrumental
considerations already since the beginning of our
study period, and they were also most susceptible
to initiating the cultural change toward a
marriage pattern characterized by more romantic
motives.
The degree in which the marriage choices
were and remained affected by instrumental
considerations differed by class. The elite
were associated with patriarchal values and
instrumental partner selection strategies (Gillis,
1985; Shorter, 1975) to the extent that it
seems rather unlikely that romantic love pushed
them rapidly into relationships characterized by
age homogamy (Stone, 1977). The farmers’
attitude was largely similar (Schlumbohm,
1991). For both of these groups it also
applies that they required much more stringent
minimum standards for independent household
formation.
The middle class was typically associated
with respect for the formal family scripts and
the idea of a male breadwinner supporting
wife and children (Perrot, 1989; Van den
Eeckhout, 1993). This was stimulated by the
need for distinction with the lower classes and
the middle class strategy of imitation of the
elite. There were, however, also indications
that the middle class took some interest
in romantization (see Bulcroft & Bulcroft,
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1997) or even was the driving force behind
it (Frykman & Lo¨fgren, 1987). The middle
class had the cultural capital and economic
freedom to put romantic partner selection
into practice (Stone, 1977). Their position
was therefore not unequivocal. Although they
sometimes pictured the aristocracy as an old
elite with a degenerated lifestyle, loose morals,
and pretentious rituals, Frykman and Lo¨fgren
stressed the fact that marriages among the
bourgeoisie were ‘‘asymmetric alliances.’’ They
observed that ‘‘the older man . . . saw himself as
provider and protector of a young and innocent
wife’’ and that ‘‘this pattern made marriage
into a parent-child relationship rather than a
partnership of equals’’ (Frykman & Lo¨fgren,
pp. 101 – 102).
Probably most susceptible to the new
marriage model was the lower class—the group
that was least bounded by the protection of
property. It is important to stress that also in the
lower classes there was some receptivity for the
bourgeois ideal of the classical family. The lower
classes were keen on gaining respectability,
which perhaps can be illustrated by their
celebration of family events and their wish
to acquire at least some property (Lis, 1977),
although it was not easy to put norms about the
ideal family life, such as the male breadwinner
model, into practice (Van den Eeckhout, 1993).
Yet other aspects of the new ideal could be lived
up to, such as the ‘‘compulsion to marry.’’
It is important, however, that this urge for
respectability was not in contradiction with the
previously discussed new marriage pattern, quite
the contrary. Both suggest, for example, a very
positive evaluation of being married.
Cities were the core sites of economic change.
Viewed from an instrumental perspective, age
homogamy could more easily and earlier be
realized in (industrial) cities because the eco-
nomic situation here changed more dramatically
because of the industrialization and the inten-
sification of the wage economy. But big cities
in general were also the core area of cultural
change. In the first half of the 19th century,
in most cities social life was still traditional and
was organized by guilds (Van Isacker, 1978), but
this changed dramatically in the late 19th cen-
tury because of economic changes, population
growth, new technology, and the rise of large
working-class neighborhoods. These develop-
ments gave rise to new forms of recreation
and social interaction. Activities organized by
individuals and small groups replaced large-
scale community events typical for agricultural
and artisans’ communities. Neighborhood pubs
that attracted a mixed audience replaced the
artisans’ pubs. Young people spent time with
friends made at work or school. Leisure possi-
bilities such as dance halls and cinemas became
the new meeting opportunities (Tilly & Scott,
1978). Although cities had always been different
from the countryside, they became even more the
site of innovation. The concentration of people,
ideas, and information broadened one’s horizon
and expectations. People were confronted with
different lifestyles. The town’s anonymity made
social control more difficult (Gillis, 1985; Tilly
& Scott). In this way the late 19th century big city
offered good conditions for detraditionalization
of all kinds of relations.
We also assume that religion played a role
in the adoption of a new marriage pattern.
One argument is that the degree to which
the couple really had a say in their marriage
varied greatly by religion. Consequently, the
resistance toward the new marriage pattern
may also be expected to differ by religion.
This can be illustrated by the differing visions
regarding the ‘‘need for consensus’’ between
partners. If it is believed that consensus between
partners is required for marriage, this means
that the parents’ (and the groom’s) influence
and their instrumental preferences are somewhat
restricted. From the 16th century on, there was a
growing tendency to stress the parental authority
in marriage decisions. Lutheran Protestants and
Catholics following the Counter-Reformation
attacked the former idea that consent of the
two parties was the only necessary element in
a marriage. In Catholic family ethics, parental
authority and solidarity between generations was
emphasized. Parents and the local clergy had
to keep a tight rein on adolescent children.
In religions where parental authority over the
children’s marital decisions was stressed, more
weight was also attached to the power and
dominance of the husband over that of his
wife. Hence, marriages were favored in which
men could more easily exercise this dominance
by means of their age advantage. The issue
of marital power in relationship to religion
has a special significance in the light of the
ongoing discussion on the Reformation’s impact
on the status of women and the nature of the
family (McQuillan, 1999). Several historians
have argued that the Reformation brought new
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restrictions on women, confining them to the role
of wife and mother under the domination of their
husband (see Roper, 1989). Luther in particular
has been accused of laying the ideological
groundwork for an increasingly authoritarian
model of family life. Catholics were not too
different it seems. McQuillan (1999) did not, for
example, find any marked differences between
Catholics and Lutherans in the age gap between
spouses. The authoritarian model could be found
in Belgium and in the south and the east of the
Netherlands, where Catholicism was dominant.
In the other parts of the Netherlands, the less
stern variants of Calvinism were dominant (De
Moor & Van Zanden, 2006). We therefore expect
to find a lower level of age homogamy in these
Protestant municipalities.
Hypotheses
Our main hypothesis is that age homogamy
increased in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury (Hypothesis 1). We discussed two comple-
mentary perspectives regarding the underlying
causes of this change. The first one is that,
because of changing economic organization and
the increase in the standard of living in the
second half of the 19th century, a relaxation
of the Malthusian marriage principles became
feasible. The second view is that a new cul-
tural orientation toward marital choice arose in
which less instrumental and more egalitarian
principles were important. On the basis of both
views the following more specific hypotheses
can be derived. We start by specifying hypothe-
ses regarding class differences, which can be
expected from the perspective of both views:
- The elite and the farmers have the lowest levels
of age homogamy (Hypothesis 2a) and are the
slowest to adopt the new pattern. The other
sections of the middle class and particularly
the lower classes show a stronger increase in
age homogamy (Hypothesis 2b).
If only the first, ‘‘economic’’ view is correct, the
following hypotheses have to be confirmed:
- Age homogamy was higher (Hypothesis 3.1a)
and increased more strongly in industrial cities
compared to nonindustrial cities (Hypothesis
3.1b).
- Age homogamy is only the result of the
changing age structure of the marriage market
(Hypothesis 3.2).
If also the second, ‘‘cultural’’ view is correct,
the following hypotheses have to be confirmed:
- Big cities have higher levels of age homogamy
(Hypothesis 4.1a) and show the strongest
increase in age homogamy. Smaller towns and
rural areas pick up this trend later (Hypothesis
4.1b).
- Catholic municipalities have lower levels of
age homogamy (Hypothesis 4.2a) and are
slower than Protestant municipalities to adopt
the new marriage pattern (Hypothesis 4.2b).
METHOD
Data
Until recently constraints of time and money
necessitated researchers who wanted to study
patterns of age homogamy to focus on small
communities and limited time periods. During
the past decade marriage records were entered
into a database within the framework of the so-
called GENLIAS project (in the Netherlands)
and the Vital Registration project of the State
Archive of Bruges, the Demoflandria project
of K.U.Leuven University and the Historical
Database of the Lie`ge Region (in Belgium).
These projects aim to build up a database with
genealogical information from the introduction
of the vital registration on until the date these
data are no longer in the public domain.
The vital registration system was introduced
nationwide in the Netherlands in 1811 – 1812.
In Belgium and in those parts of the Netherlands
that were an integral part of the French Empire
during the Napoleonic era, the Civil Register
was even introduced in 1796. As the registration
system was functioning flawlessly only after
several years had elapsed, we decided to
include only information for the years 1812
and later. From the marriage certificates the
following information was used: the date and
place of marriage and the places of birth,
ages, and occupations of brides and grooms.
For the Netherlands complete data sets could
be used for 5 (of the 11) Dutch provinces:
Zeeland, Limburg, Gelderland, Groningen, and
Overijssel. The total number of marriages in the
database that we use for this analysis is 642,371:
116,694 in Overijssel, 99,325 in Limburg,
203,129 in Gelderland, 126,907 in Groningen,
and 96,316 in Zeeland. The Belgian data cover
both Walloon and Flemish cities, the Flemish
province of West-Flanders, and some Walloon
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villages. Different sampling strategies were
used: For Ghent, 1 in 12 marriage certificates was
included; for Leuven and Aalst, 1 in 3; for Lie`ge,
1 in 10; for Verviers, an alphabetical sample was
extracted. For the other Belgian municipalities,
all marriages are included. The total number
of Belgian marriage certificates is 124,041:
114,706 in Flanders and 9,335 in Wallonia.
Context
The Dutch regions selected for this study
have a diverse socioeconomic structure. In the
coastal provinces of Groningen and Zeeland,
the economy was almost entirely dependent
on (highly productive) agriculture, with large-
scale farms producing specialized primary
products. The economies of these regions
started to change in the second half of the
19th century, when industrial activities based
mainly on agricultural products developed. Both
provinces had intensive contacts with the outside
world through the well-developed transportation
network, the seaports, and their highly market-
oriented agricultural activities. In the eastern and
southern Dutch provinces (Limburg, Gelderland,
and Overijssel), agriculture was the most
important activity as well. But in contrast
to the coastal provinces, farms there were
much smaller, the infrastructure was less well
developed, and the productivity of land and labor
was much lower. In the Limburg capital city of
Maastricht, large-scale industries developed for
the first time in the Netherlands.
In the 19th century, Belgium pioneered
the industrial revolution on the European
continent. The most important industrial cities
in Belgium are included in our database: Ghent,
Verviers, Lie`ge, and Aalst. Ghent experienced
its industrial takeoff from 1800 onward, mainly
on the basis of the cotton industry. Verviers was
a small center that underwent an early takeoff on
the basis of its woolen industry. Aalst was a quiet
city in the first half of the 19th century. From
1880 – 1890 on, industry expanded and factories
became larger. Lie`ge was a large city with
many professionals and shopkeepers working
alongside both artisans such as weapon makers
and newer types of workers such as coal miners.
During the 1820s mechanization in the textile
industry prompted the modernization of the iron
industry with its coke-fired blast furnaces as
well as of coal mining. The provincial town of
Leuven was a medium-sized city that gradually
lost the traditional craft and agricultural roots of
its economy. Leuven played an important role in
administration and education.
Our database also covers the Belgian coun-
tryside. The Walloon villages are located in the
Pays de Herve (characterized by cattle breed-
ing and proto-industrial textile production) and
the Ardennes (characterized by semilandless
peasants who lived in miserable conditions).
The economy of the coastal province of West-
Flanders was mainly based on agriculture. Many
people combined agricultural activities with
spinning and weaving within a cottage indus-
try framework. In the west and the north of the
province, agriculture was much more large scale
and market oriented.
Variables
As the hypothesis concerns the straightfor-
ward claim that age homogamy increased, we
constructed age homogamy as a dichotomous,
dependent variable in the analysis, distinguish-
ing between age-homogamous (same age mar-
riages) and age-heterogamous marriages. In
the descriptive part, however, we further dis-
tinguished between older husband marriages
and older wife marriages to provide more
empirical background. We opted for a strict
definition—and, hence, a strong test—of age
similarity. We defined a same age marriage as
a marriage in which the age difference between
the partners is less than 2 years. If grooms or
brides were at least 2 years older than their part-
ner, we defined a marriage as age heterogamous.
This strict definition prevents a misinterpreta-
tion of a possible trend in age homogamy. If for
example we were to use a 5-year difference in
age as the criterion, a (very) large part of these
same age marriages might, in fact, be marriages
where the husband is 3 to 5 years older. Even
though this may be, in many societies, the modal
value of the age difference between spouses, we
think that such a broad definition would leave
unanswered the question of whether a rise in
age homogamy truly reflects a rise in egalitarian
relationships. For the multivariate analysis, we
performed some sensitivity tests using alterna-
tive age difference criteria (refer to the Results
section).
At the individual level we used information
on period, class, the age at marriage, and the
migration status. Because a general increase
in the number of age-homogamous marriages
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is expected trough the observation period, the
period in which the marriage took place was
introduced in the model with the continuous
variable marriage year, centered around the year
1860 to make the intercept interpretable.
The groom’s class was determined on the
basis of his occupation. We classified all occu-
pations in a class system applicable for the whole
period, namely the Social Power scheme (Van
de Putte & Miles, 2005). This scheme uses skill,
possession, position within a hierarchical orga-
nizational structure, and prestige characteristics
as criteria to distinguish classes. Lower class
subgroups are unskilled workers (Social Power
[SP] Level 1), semiskilled workers (SP Level 2),
and skilled workers (SP Level 3). The middle
class (SP Level 4) is mainly composed of mas-
ter artisans, retailers, farmers, and clerks. For
this study we excluded farmers from the middle
class and put them in a separate category. The
elite (SP Level 5) comprises white collar and
professional specialists (e.g., lawyers), whole-
sale dealers, factory owners, and the aristocracy.
The latter group, however, is too small to be
classified in a separate category.
In the descriptive analysis of the age at first
marriage, age was measured using a parametrical
variable. In the logistic regression analysis, age
at marriage was classified in eight groups: under
20, 20 – 24, . . ., 45 – 49, and above 50. We
included age at marriage in this analysis to
control for the effect of the age structure of
the marriage market because there were no
other ways of doing this with the present data.
The number of (unmarried) men and women
at every age was, for example, not available
for all municipalities over the studied period.
Migration status was classified in two categories:
natives (the place of birth is also the place of
marriage) versus migrants (the place of birth
differs from the place of marriage). This variable
was included because migrants typically have
substantially higher ages at marriage.
We used three variables at the municipal
level. The distinction between urban and rural
communities was based on information on
the number of inhabitants at the end of
the period (1913): cities (communities with
20,000 or more inhabitants), provincial towns
(with 5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants), and the
countryside (the rest). To measure the religious
composition of municipalities we used the
percentage of Catholics in 1910 (classified in
four groups: 0%– 25%, 25%– 50%, 50%– 75%,
and 75%– 100%). The third variable is region
(for Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia; for the
Netherlands: the provinces).
Unfortunately, we do not possess high-quality
indicators of industrialization at the municipal
level. Assessing the impact of industrialization
was only possible by comparing industrial cities
(such as Ghent, Lie`ge, and Verviers from
the early 19th century onward and Aalst and
Maastricht at later stages) to nonindustrial cities.
Given that large-scale industrialization was not
geographically widespread, as such this was not
too problematic.
Multilevel Logistic Regression
We analyzed the probability that the marriage
partners had the same age with a two-level
logistic regression model, marriages clustered
within municipalities. Observations were spread
over 623 municipalities with a minimum of 20
marriages in each municipality. Four different
models were tested. In all models we included
random intercepts to allow us to examine
whether there was a significant difference in
the occurrence of age homogamy between the
municipalities. In the models, the main intercept
then represents the odds across all municipalities
for the reference categories in 1860. Model 1
is a basic model to test whether age homogamy
increased (Hypothesis 1) and whether there were
differences in age homogamy by class of the
groom, degree of urbanization, and religious
composition of the municipality (Hypotheses
2a, 4.1a, 4.2a). The independent variables were
period, migration status of bride, migration
status of groom and class at the individual
level, the degree of urbanization, the religious
composition of the municipalities, and region at
the municipal level.
In Model 2 interaction terms were introduced
to test whether the period effect differs according
to the class of the groom, the degree of urbaniza-
tion, and the religious composition of the munic-
ipality (Hypotheses 2b, 4.1b, 4.2b). In Model
3 we added a random effect of period (a so-
called random slope) to investigate whether the
period effect on age homogamy differed between
municipalities. In this model, the fixed effect
of period then represented the general period
effect across all municipalities. The results for
the period effect per municipality allowed us
to evaluate the differences between nonindus-
trial and industrial cities (Hypothesis 3.1b).
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The differences between the random intercepts
(for the year 1860) permitted us to evaluate
whether the level of age homogamy was already
higher in the early industrial cities before the sec-
ond half of the 19th century (Hypothesis 3.1a).
In Model 4 the age at marriage of bride
and groom was included to control for the
effect of the changing age structure (Hypothesis
3.2). Younger male age groups have better
chances of an age-homogamous marriage, and
the decline of the age at marriage may therefore
‘‘automatically’’ result in an increase of age
homogamy. For women the mechanism is
similar as there is not a (perfect) linear effect of
age on the chance to have an age-homogamous
marriage. Because of the general difference
in the age at marriage by sex, chances for
women to have an age-homogamous marriage
are smaller at very young ages compared to
women marrying in their mid-20s. Tolerance
tests made clear that there is no multicollinearity
problem for this model. The model provides a
conservative test because, by included age at
marriage, assumed that the decline of the age
at marriage is not determined by the cultural
change under examination.
First Marriages
Age differences between spouses are usually
smaller in first marriages than in remarriages.
This is related to the special character of
remarriages. These happen on different marriage
markets, are evaluated differently by parents
and the wider community, and are experienced
differently by the spouses. For this reason we
restricted the analysis to first marriages only,
that is, to marriages in which both husband and
wife have not been married before. Including
remarriages would also complicate the analysis
(e.g., by the necessary inclusion of many
interaction parameters).
RESULTS
Descriptive Results
Figure 1 presents the development over time
in the pattern of age homogamy. There was a
gradual but consistent growth in the proportion
of marriages contracted by men and women of
about the same age. The preference for same
age partners was most visible in the Flemish
cities. In the other regions, age homogamy
was the highest in Zeeland, Wallonia, West-
Flanders, and Groningen; it was the lowest
in the provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel, and
Limburg. In the Flemish cities, the percentage
of age-homogamous marriages increased in one
century by about 20 percentage points; in the
other provinces it increased by 7 – 10 percentage
points. In this process regional differences hardly
changed.
The increase of age homogamy went together
with a decrease of older husband marriages
and older wife marriages. Figure 2 shows
that marriages with grooms being 2 or more
years older also showed very strong regional
differences: They were less frequent in the
Flemish cities, in Zeeland, Groningen, and
Wallonia and more common in the eastern
and southern Dutch provinces and particularly
in West-Flanders. This pattern is illuminating.
Older husband marriages were less frequent
in areas where cities dominated (Flemish
cities, Wallonia) and in the least isolated
areas of the Netherlands (Zeeland, Groningen),
whereas they were highest in the Catholic
provinces (West-Flanders, Limburg) and the
most isolated provinces in the east of the
Netherlands (Gelderland, Overijssel). For older
wife marriages, a strong decrease was visible
everywhere (Figure 3). These marriages were
less common in West-Flanders and in the
Flemish cities than in the Dutch regions.
It was not only age homogamy that changed
during the second half of the 19th century.
In almost all regions ages at first marriage
increased between the beginning of the 19th
century and 1860, whereas after that period ages
at first marriage strongly decreased (Van de
Putte, 2005; Van Poppel, Liefbroer, Vermunt,
& Smeenk, 2001). The pattern was similar for
men and women, although ages at marriage were
generally 2 to 4 years higher for the former. This
means that any trend in age homogamy was not
the product of a divergent trend of the ages at
marriage of brides and grooms. Furthermore,
there were large and very consistent regional
differences. Men and women in Zeeland and
Groningen married on average 2 to 3 years
earlier than grooms and brides in Gelderland
and Limburg. Bear in mind that precisely
the former provinces also showed the highest
proportion of same-age marriages, whereas the
latter showed the lowest number. This indicates
the connection between both characteristics. In
the Flemish cities the age at marriage decreased
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FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE AGE-HOMOGAMOUS MARRIAGES BY REGION AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE, FIRST MARRIAGES.
FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF OLDER HUSBAND MARRIAGES BY REGION AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE, FIRST MARRIAGES.
most rapidly—which is again consistent with the
strong rise of age homogamy in the same period.
Although it is clear that the decrease in the age
at marriage in the second half of the 19th century
matched the rise in age homogamy, this does
not mean that both characteristics were perfectly
related. The age at marriage in the Flemish cities,
for example, was certainly not very different
from that in Zeeland and Groningen. It is also
worthwhile to point out that the increase of the
age at marriage in the first half of the 19th century
in all areas was not reflected in a decrease of age
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FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF OLDER WIFE MARRIAGES BY REGION AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE, FIRST MARRIAGES.
homogamy in the same period (Figure 1). To
assess the relation between both characteristics
in depth we have to measure age homogamy
controlling for the age at marriage.
Multivariate Analysis
The results for Model 1 are shown in Table 1.
As expected there was a period effect. For each
year, the odds of marrying an age peer were
1.005 times higher than the year before. If
we were to use less strict definitions of age
homogamy, the odds of marrying an age peer
would have been even higher (b = .0067 and
b = .007 for a 3-year and 5-year criterion,
respectively; data not shown). This confirms
Hypothesis 1, which claims that there was an
increase of age homogamy in the second half of
the 19th century.
Next we look at the variables at the individual
level. Class was associated with age homogamy
as expected (Hypothesis 2a). The elite’s and the
farmers’ chances to marry age homogamously
were smaller than they were for the skilled
workers (the reference group). For the middle
class the difference was less strong. The other
subgroups of the lower class hardly differed
from the skilled workers. The control variable
migration status also mattered. Migrant grooms’
chances to marry age homogamously were
smaller, and, to a lesser extent, this was also
the case for migrant brides.
Next we turn to the variables at the
municipal level. People living in big cities had
better chances of marrying age homogamously,
which confirms Hypothesis 4.1a. The difference
between medium-sized towns and villages was
not significant. Mind that this difference between
cities and other contexts was controlled for
class. It is not only because of the number of
farmers that age homogamy was less frequent
in the countryside. The religious composition of
municipalities was also important. Compared
to the homogeneous Catholic municipalities,
people marrying in municipalities with hardly
any Catholics were more likely to have an
age-homogamous marriage. This is in line
with their stronger emphasis on the consent
of both partners and confirms Hypothesis 4.2a.
Finally region also mattered. Controlled for other
variables in the model, the chance to marry age
homogamously was the highest in the Flemish
municipalities, followed by Zeeland, Limburg,
Groningen, and Wallonia. For Overijssel and
Gelderland, age homogamy was the least likely
to occur. These results are very similar to the
ones observed in the descriptive analysis. Only
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Limburg had a different position because of the
control for Catholicism in this model.
In short, the results obtained by applying
Model 1 are the ones expected in case the
cultural view is also valid. In Model 2 (Table 1)
we added interaction terms to test whether the
rise of age homogamy differed by category.
The exponent (B) estimates for the interaction
terms show the factor by which the period
effect of the reference category (here 1.004;
in the Table recorded as the main effect for
period) of the second variable in the interaction
(respectively class, size, and religion) needs to
be multiplied to find the period effect for the
other categories of that variable. All estimates
for the interaction between period and class are
smaller than one. This means that the period
effect was strongest for the skilled workers (the
reference category). The differences with the
middle class and the elite were, however, not
large and not significant. The results for the elite
are not in line with Hypothesis 2b. As in our class
scheme we included not only the aristocracy but
also many people from what other authors have
described as the new (professional) middle class,
this finding may be related to the composition
of this group. Yet the difference with farmers
was larger (the odds ratio being only 1.002
compared to 1.004 for the reference group)
confirming that farmers were least eager to adopt
the new marriage pattern. The other effects were
completely in line with the hypotheses. There
was a different pace according to the type of
municipality. The period effect was strongest in
big cities (the odds ratio being 1.007). Also, in
middle-sized towns the increase was somewhat
larger compared to villages (Hypothesis 4.1b).
The new marriage pattern was clearly an urban
phenomenon (although to some extent also
present in rural areas). Finally, there was also
an interaction effect between period and religion
(Hypothesis 4.2b). Not surprisingly, the increase
was strongest in municipalities with the lowest
percentage of Catholics (the odds ratio being
1.006).
Altogether the picture that emerges is very
plausible. Age homogamy increased everywhere
and in every social group. It was a general
change, but the rise was strongest in Protestant
areas and in big cities and was slowest among
farmers. These interactions are generally in line
with what could be expected in case the cultural
view on the shift in the marriage pattern is also
valid.
We use Model 3 (Table 1) to evaluate
the effect of industrialization. The estimates
for the variables did not differ substantially
from those in Model 2. Table 2 gives an
overview of the random effects for the big
cities. The intercepts show the differences in the
level of age homogamy in 1860 (the reference
category for period). After half a century of
industrialization, the level of age homogamy
was high in Ghent and the nonindustrial cities of
Oostende, Aalst, Enschede, and Leuven. The
level of age homogamy was lower for the
industrial cities of Lie`ge and Verviers. The
period effect was strongest for Ghent, followed
by Aalst, Leuven, Maastricht, Enschede, and
Apeldoorn. The period effect averaged (or was
below average) for Verviers, Lie`ge, and the other
cities. Thus of the three cities with the strongest
experience of industrialization (namely, Ghent,
Lie`ge, and Verviers), Ghent was the only town
to show a particularly high level and strong rise
in age homogamy. Consider, furthermore, that
the rise of age homogamy was also present in
medium-sized towns and rural villages. In short,
we found no support for Hypotheses 3.1a and
3.1b and, hence, no evidence for the view that
the change of age homogamy was the direct
product of industrialization.
In Model 4 we included age at marriage
as a conservative test of the effect of the age
structure of the marriage market (Table 3). By
including these variables we controlled for the
fact that the age of the spouses was related to
the chance of attracting an age peer, but we
also controlled for the fact that the youngest
had a stronger preference for an age peer.
Nevertheless, the period effect remained present.
Yet we have to point to the lower values of
the parameter estimates for migrant grooms,
farmers, the elite, the middle class, and cities in
Model 4 compared to Model 3. The estimates for
the least Catholic municipalities were even no
longer significant. This shows that differences
in age homogamy were to some extent related
to differences in ages at marriage. The Catholic
religion, for example, exerted its influence via
a (particularly) high average age at marriage of
grooms, which was about 2 years higher in the
most Catholic municipalities compared to the
least Catholic municipalities, resulting in a large
age difference.
This analysis confirms that marrying at a
relatively old age typically implied marrying a
partner who did not have the same age. But the
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Table 3. Results of the Two-Level Logistic Regression Analysis for Model 4
Model 4
Variables B SE p OR
Intercept −0.744 0.045 <.0001 0.475
Period (0 = 1860) 0.004 0.000 <.0001 1.004
Age groom (Ref: 25 – 29 years) Below 20 0.707 0.013 <.0001 2.028
20 – 24 years 0.737 0.007 <.0001 2.090
30 – 34 years −0.785 0.009 <.0001 0.456
35 – 39 years −1.382 0.017 <.0001 0.251
40 – 44 years −1.700 0.029 <.0001 0.183
45 – 49 years −1.932 0.046 <.0001 0.145
50 and more years −2.749 0.073 <.0001 0.064
Age bride (Ref: 25 – 29 years) Below 20 −1.387 0.012 <.0001 0.250
20 – 24 years −0.518 0.007 <.0001 0.595
30 – 34 years −0.142 0.010 <.0001 0.868
35 – 39 years −0.223 0.018 <.0001 0.800
40 – 44 years −0.068 0.032 0.0342 0.934
45 – 49 years 0.204 0.052 <.0001 1.226
50 and more years 0.468 0.082 <.0001 1.596
Migration status groom (Ref: Native) Migrant −0.085 0.006 <.0001 0.918
Migration status bride (Ref: Native) Migrant −0.049 0.006 <.0001 0.952
SOCPO (Ref: Skilled worker) Unskilled worker −0.026 0.009 0.0041 0.974
Semiskilled worker 0.018 0.011 0.0871 1.018
Farmer −0.094 0.011 <.0001 0.910
Middle class −0.066 0.013 <.0001 0.936
Elite −0.106 0.025 <.0001 0.899
Size place of marriage (Ref: Countryside) City 0.100 0.023 <.0001 1.106
Provincial town 0.005 0.013 0.7114 1.005
Religion place of marriage (Ref: 75 – 100%
Cath.)
0 – 25% Catholics 0.011 0.021 0.6168 1.011
25 – 50% Catholics −0.009 0.030 0.7606 0.991
50 – 75% Catholics −0.042 0.036 0.2538 0.959
Region (Ref: Wallonia) Limburg −0.018 0.045 0.6815 0.982
Zeeland 0.111 0.049 0.0231 1.117
Overijssel −0.108 0.050 0.0301 0.898
Gelderland −0.118 0.048 0.0149 0.889
Groningen −0.062 0.050 0.2179 0.940
Flanders 0.324 0.045 <.0001 1.383
Period * SOCPO (Ref: Skilled worker) Unskilled worker −0.001 0.000 <.0001 0.999
Semiskilled worker −0.001 0.000 0.0311 0.999
Farmer −0.001 0.000 0.0168 0.999
Middle class 0.000 0.000 0.2324 1.000
Elite −0.001 0.001 0.2538 0.999
Period * Size place of marriage (Ref:
countryside)
City 0.003 0.001 <.0001 1.003
Provincial town 0.000 0.000 0.3653 1.000
Period * Religion place of marriage (Ref:
75 – 100% Catholics)
0 – 25% Catholics 0.001 0.000 <.0001 1.001
25 – 50% Catholics 0.001 0.001 0.3186 1.001
50 – 75% Catholics 0.001 0.001 0.3864 1.001
Residual variance between municipalities 0.007 0.001 <.001
Note: N = 728,416. Ref = Reference Category; SOCPO = Social Power.
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fact that the period effect was still present in
Model 4 shows that the rise in age homogamy
was not only the mechanical product of a decline
of the age at marriage. In other words, there is
no support for the hypothesis (3.2) derived from
the position that only the economic view on the
increase of age homogamy is valid.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we examined the emergence
of a new marriage pattern, characterized not
only by declining celibacy rates and decreasing
ages at marriage but also by an increase in
age homogamy. This was a consistent and
very general trend in both the Netherlands
and Belgium, in both urban and rural areas,
in Protestant and Catholic regions, and in
every social class. A decline in the age
differences between spouses was obviously a
key characteristic of the change in the EMP.
Although this rise in age homogamy occurred
together with the decline of the age at marriage,
it was not the simple product of the relaxation
of the Malthusian marriage principles. This is
shown by the fact that the increase in age
homogamy was still observed after controlling
for the changing age structure of the marriage
market. Contrary to earlier studies on the
evolution of age homogamy, we used a large data
set, relating to a variety of social and economic
contexts, and applied sophisticated statistical
methods. We used different criteria to define age
homogamy and showed that the choice of the
criterion did not affect our results. Furthermore,
we were able to present a quantitative description
of a trend that is typically discussed using
qualitative methods.
Our study was not limited to a pure description
of trends. As far as it was possible with the
data we had at our disposal, we attempted to
identify some of the mechanisms involved in
the process. We found that there were important
differences in the strength of the trend. The
increase of age homogamy was strongest in big
cities, both industrial and nonindustrial, and in
the least Catholic areas. In terms of class, the
farmers were the least eager to follow the trend.
Furthermore, the trend in age homogamy did
not match the pattern of industrialization in time
or place, indicating that there was more than a
pure economic evolution at stake that made it
easier to meet the requirement of an instrumental
partner choice. These findings seem to suggest
that the rise of the new marriage regime followed
a cultural pattern. The standard of living rose in
the second half of the 19th century, and this
may very well have been a necessary condition
for the adoption of a less instrumental and
more egalitarian practice. Yet the rise of the
standard of living did not automatically imply
that people stopped calculating. Stopping this
old practice also required a different view on
marriage, one that stated that not calculating was
valuable. Therefore, the rise in age homogamy
was patterned along cultural lines. In the big
cities where young people met in less controlled
locations, such as pubs and dance halls, age
homogamy rose most strongly. In Protestant
areas, people were confronted with norms about
consent of both marriage partners that were
more in line with the new marriage patterns.
But socioeconomic factors also patterned age
homogamy. Farmers, bounded as they were by
the preoccupation of maintaining one’s property,
were the ones who least eagerly adopted the new
pattern.
This does not mean that every aspect of the
shift of the marriage pattern is clarified. An
interesting topic for future discussion concerns
gender issues. It was claimed earlier (Matthijs,
2002) that women initiated the new marriage
pattern. Matthijs argued that, as a reaction to
the increased separation between the public and
private domain, which was of course not gender
neutral, women reorganized the private domain
and stressed romantic values and patterns of
behavior. This was translated in a ‘‘mimetic
appetite for marriage,’’ which was observable
in the decline of the age at marriage and the
decrease of celibacy. An interesting factor in
this debate is that the rise of age homogamy was
not only the result of the declining numbers of
older husband marriages but also and even more
consistent with the declining number of older
wife marriages, which were perhaps even more
at odds with the romantic ideal (Perrot, 1989;
Shorter, 1975).
Another point of discussion is whether there
are alternative, demographic explanations for
our findings. Given that the general trend in age
homogamy was present in all these regions, a
possible demographic explanation must be valid
for all these regions as well. Apart from the
above mentioned decline of the age at marriage,
we only see one other possible explanation. It
cannot be excluded that population growth was
driving the trend in age homogamy because it
The Rise of Age Homogamy 1251
might be easier to find a partner with the same
age in case the pool of possible partners enlarged.
As we also included an urbanization variable on
the basis of population size in the models, we
could not include population size as an extra
variable in the models. Yet replacing the former
with the latter as a test did not alter the presented
results for period and the interaction terms of
Class and Religion × Period (data not shown).
This shows that our outcomes support the view
that more was happening than can be explained
by pure marriage market logics. This does not
exclude that some of the specific findings can
be explained by the functioning of the marriage
market. Especially the difference between cities,
small towns, and villages—in which marriage
market conditions were not very favorable for
age homogamy—might partly be related to this.
What are the consequences of this evolution
of age homogamy? In the introduction we
mentioned that large age differences between
spouses might have had consequences for
various aspects of family life. Large age
differences between spouses implied large age
differences between father (or mother) and child,
which had consequences for their daily relations
and style of communication, strengthening the
parental authority over children (Sieder, 1978).
Barbieri and Hertrich (2005) convincingly
showed that large age differences strongly hinder
the adoption of contraceptive practices because
they are not conducive to either individual
decision making by women in subordinate
positions or to the elaboration of shared conjugal
prospects by persons who are at different stages
in their life cycles. We think that when studying
the 19th century’s fertility decline and its
sociospatial variation, this factor must be taken
into account to identify the reasons why some
groups lagged behind in that decline.
The age differences between spouses
observed in the Low Countries were much lower
than the ones found in Asian and African coun-
tries (Casterline, Williams, & McDonald, 1986;
Todd, 1983). Small age differences were thus an
integral and defining part of the EMP. Nonethe-
less, within countries characterized by the EMP
there were large differences in the degree of
age homogamy between classes and regions and
over time. Incorporating age differences between
spouses as defining elements of the EMP might
help in refining our ideas of how this pattern
differed from those in other parts of the world
and in making clear what the consequences of
this pattern were for the couples, their children,
and other kin members involved.
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